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BUILDING BLOCKS OF ANALYSIS: USING
SIMPLE "SESAME STREET SKILLS" AND
SOPHISTICATED EDUCATIONAL LEARNING
THEORIES IN TEACHING A SEMINAR IN
LEGAL ANALYSIS AND WRITING
Nancy Millich*
I. INTRODUCTION
Traditional law school teaching fails some law stu-
dents-both in law school and ultimately on the bar exami-
nation. Law professors sometimes blame the students who
have not learned the law, but the problem may be (at least in
part) in the way that the professors teach the law. Legal
scholars frequently criticize law professors for "inundat[ing]
students with substantive and procedural rules of law, but
rarely if ever provid[ing] any guidance or instruction in meth-
ods of learning."' Indeed, the criticism may reveal a more ba-
sic problem, in that many, if not most, law professors either
are themselves untutored in educational methodology or do
not attempt to incorporate learning theories into the struc-
ture of their courses.2
In Learning Strategies for Law Students, John Marshall
Law School Associate Professor of Law Paul T. Wangerin pro-
vides a comprehensive description of current learning theo-
ries as they apply to the study of law.3 Professor Wangerin
specifies that among the intended audiences for his article
were "teachers of legal writing courses" and instructors of
programs that "principally address the academic problems of
* Assistant Professor of Law, Santa Clara University School of Law. J.D.,
Santa Clara University School of Law.
1. Paul T. Wangerin, Learning Strategies for Law Students, 52 ALB. L.
REV. 471, 471 (1988). See also, Jay Feinman & Marc Feldman, Pedagogy &
Politics, 73 GEO. L.J. 875, 875 (1985) ("At most law schools, the purposes and
methods of teaching are regarded as unfruitful, if not unfit, topics for
conversation.").
2. Feinman & Feldman, supra note 1, at 895 ("Law professors have long
believed that educational theorists are either charlatans or primitives.").
3. Wangerin, supra note 1.
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... students who received poor grades early in law school."4
His article was written, in part, in the hope that the
"thoughtful use of the learning strategies discussed in [the]
article [could] significantly increase the effectiveness of
learning and teaching by each audience." '
This article explains a model upper-division Seminar in
Legal Analysis and Writing developed for the latter group,
"students who have received poor grades" during their first
year in law school. The seminar helps the students to de-
velop the building blocks of legal analysis by doing a series of
fairly short, highly structured exercises that teach the stu-
dents to do legal analysis step by step.' The course's method-
ology differs from the traditional first-year law classes, since
it integrates a simple, practical approach to legal analysis-
"Sesame Street skills"-with two of the sophisticated educa-
tional learning theories advanced by Professor Wangerin-
Metacognition7 and the Autonomous Learning Model.8 "Ses-
ame Street skills" are analytical building blocks that virtu-
ally all students develop before they reach college. In class
discussions, the professor helps students in the seminar to
recognize the similarities between the analytical skills they
need to do well in law school and the "Sesame Street skills"
they have already learned in their developing years.
The seminar utilizes educational learning theories and
develops the corollary skills through the interactive nature of
the classes, which involve weekly writing by the students, ex-
tensive written critiques of their assignments, individual oral
conferences, and rewriting and recritiquing of each exercise.
This interactive cycle reinforces the sophisticated learning
theories of Metacognition and the Autonomous Learning
Model.9 One of these learning theories, Metacognition, is stu-
dent-driven. 10 It involves enabling the student to become
aware of the legal learning process in order to master the
4. Id. at 473.
5. Id.
6. See infra, notes 29-32, 38 and accompanying text for sample exercises.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 36-48 (defining and discussing
Metacognition).
8. See infra text accompanying notes 74-89 (defining and discussing the
Autonomous Learning Model).
9. See infra text accompanying notes 41-48.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 36-40.
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challenge of law school." The seminar achieves this goal by
actively involving the students in the process of legal reason-
ing from the outset of the course. The other learning theory,
the Autonomous Learning Model, is teacher-driven. It en-
ables the law professor to dissect the learning process into its
basic components and to focus on the aspects of learning that
are most critical to a particular course.12 Using this Model,
the professor can simplify the process of legal analysis and
help the students to recognize that they have already mas-
tered many of the analytical skills in their everyday lives.
The results of the seminar methodology appear to be very
promising in terms of the students' evaluations of the course,
their grades in law school, and their passage rates on the Cal-
ifornia Bar Examination.' 3  The methodology would also
seem likely to work well with all upper-division students as
an alternative to traditional teaching. It is also advisable to
incorporate some of the methodology into first-year writing
courses so that law students can begin to learn the building
blocks of legal analysis from the time they first enter law
school.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 36-40.
12. See infra notes 74, 79 and accompanying text.
13. The Seminar in Legal Analysis and Writing is required for all law stu-
dents whose grade point average falls below a certain level. Students who have
taken the course report a marked improvement in their grades on subsequent
law school examinations. In addition, the students have passed the California
Bar Examination at a higher rate than would have been expected based on
their class rankings at the time they graduated from law school. Student evalu-
ations of the course have been consistently high, with the average overall rating
of the course for the past three years being a 1.35 on a scale of 1 to 5 (1 =
outstanding, 2 = good, 3 = satisfactory, 4 = improvement needed, and 5 = unsat-
isfactory). Specific comments regarding the course include the following:
"Honestly the best I've had at SCU."
"More than excellent. I particularly appreciated [the] written critiques.
They were very helpful."
"Excellent training for real-life lawyering."
"This is the most practical, useful and valuable law school course I've ever
had."
"Prior to this class, I felt very uncertain of my abilities in legal writing.
[The] instructions were clear and [the professor] initially helped us to organize
our papers. After that foundation, I was able to concentrate on the substance of
the writing-and always got clear and concise feedback. This is one of the best
classes I've had in law school."
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II. BACKGROUND OF THE SEMINAR IN LEGAL ANALYSIS AND
WRITING
Many law schools require that every student undertake
some significant writing after the first year as a condition of
graduation. This upper-division writing requirement can
typically be satisfied by producing a substantial research pa-
per for a seminar dealing with a particular area of law or
through individualized directed research under the tutelage
of a professor. Writing an article for law review or an appel-
late brief for an upper-division moot court class also meets
the requirement at most schools. In addition, students at
Santa Clara University can satisfy the requirement by com-
pleting the remedial Seminar in Legal Analysis and
Writing.14
Some law schools require that all students with grade
point averages below a certain level take a remedial seminar
in legal analysis and writing. At Santa Clara University, for
example, over seventy-five percent of the students enrolled in
the seminar in legal analysis and writing during the last five
years have been drawn from the bottom half of the class. Vir-
tually all of the remedial seminar students have significant
problems with legal analysis; some of them also have had dif-
ficulties with writing style, grammar, and/or organization.
The course must, therefore, be highly individualized, focusing
on the particular needs of each student. In order to provide
this essential one-on-one teaching, enrollment should be lim-
ited to around twenty students.
The primary goal of the seminar is to improve each stu-
dent's legal writing and analytical skills. A secondary goal of
the class is to improve the student's exam-taking techniques,
both in law school and for the bar examination. The underly-
ing theory of the course is that most law students have
problems with law school exams and the bar, not because of a
lack of substantive knowledge, but because of a lack of ana-
lytical skills. The focus of the course should be on legal anal-
ysis, because most entering law students do not have
problems with "regurgitating" the law. Rather, they gener-
ally have problems with legal analysis. If students don't
grasp the idea of what to do with the law and do not under-
14. This author is not aware of any other law schools that offer the option of
a remedial writing seminar to fulfill a student's writing requirement.
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stand how to apply the law to a set of facts, then they will
incur problems in their substantive classes, on law school ex-
ams, and ultimately, on the bar exam.
One of the keys to teaching the legal analysis seminar is
not to move too quickly. The assignments are kept short, fo-
cus on very discrete issues, and gradually add complexity as
students gain confidence in their ability to analyze the law.
III. USING SIMPLE "SESAME STREET SKILLS" IN TEACHING
THE SEMINAR IN LEGAL ANALYSIS AND WRITING
A. Building Block One: Matching
At the first meeting of the seminar, the professor should
ask the students to complete an in-class statutory exercise in
order to assess each student's performance under "exam con-
ditions." This first analytical exercise, known as the "Hog
Problem," deals with the burning issue of whether a statute
enacted to prohibit a group of children from chasing and cap-
turing a twenty-pound pig, greased with shortening, covers a
hog-wrestling match in which four adults grab a muddy, 250-
pound-hog and deposit the animal, butt first, in a barrel. The
statute involved is not complex, and the context is somewhat
amusing. This problem helps the students to "loosen up" and
begin to internalize the idea that often there isn't a right or
wrong answer. The "Hog Problem" is as follows:
Ima Hogg has recently contacted our firm to repre-
sent her in a criminal case involving her alleged participa-
tion in a greased-pig contest. Ms. Hogg was Chairman of
the State of Bliss Pork Producers' Annual Pork Days cele-
bration. She had organized a pig contest as a major attrac-
tion of the event. The contest involved a thirty-foot by
'thirty-foot pen, mud two feet deep, a fifty-gallon barrel
and a 250-pound hog. "The idea was for teams of four
adults to get in the mud with the hog, capture the animal,
and stick him in the barrel, butt first," said Hogg.
On the day of the celebration, there were thirty teams
on hand who had registered and paid the entrance fee in
order to participate in the event. Before the hog-wrestle
got under way, the local police chief told the crowd that
the contest was against state laws on cruelty to animals.
But Hogg, along with three other officials of the Pork Pro-
ducers Association, decided to test the resolve of the police
by being the first to wrestle the hog. They hopped into the
pen, slugged through the mud, and deposited the hog in
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the barrel in one minute, thirty-five seconds. "The pig
was released immediately," Hogg said. Hogg and the
other officers of the Association were thereupon arrested,
thus ending any further hog-wrestling at Pork Days.
Ms. Hogg was subsequently charged with violating
section 815 of the State of Bliss Criminal Code, which pro-
vides that "no person shall operate, run or participate in a
contest, game or other like activity, in which a pig,
greased, oiled or otherwise, is released and wherein the
object is the capture of such pig. . . ." Such participation
under section 815 is a criminal misdemeanor, punishable
by a maximum penalty of a $500 fine and ninety days in
jail. Prior to the passage of the statute, greased-pig con-
tests had been popular events at Bliss State Rodeos. In
most of these contests, a thirty- to forty-pound pig, coated
with vegetable shortening, was released in the rodeo
arena. Approximately forty youngsters, aged eight to
twelve, would try to catch the animal within twenty
seconds or less. The child who caught the pig would be
allowed to keep it.
Please draft an office memorandum discussing
whether Ms. Hogg's conduct violated section 815. Please
be sure to discuss whether Ms. Hogg's actions were cov-
ered by the provisions of the statute and whether the reg-
ulation was intended to cover such conduct.
At the start of the second class, the students' answers to
the "Hog Problem" should be returned, with extensive writ-
ten comments critiquing their analysis. A checklist should
also be distributed that delineates the statutory elements
that must be established if Ms. Hogg's conduct is covered by
the statute. The checklist should also list the similarities and
differences between hog-wrestling matches and greased-pig
contests, which help to determine whether the regulation was
intended to cover her conduct. The first part of the "Hog
Problem Checklist," dealing with whether Ms. Hogg's conduct
is covered by the statute, is as follows:
Is Ima Hogg's Conduct Covered By Section 815?
1. Statute quoted precisely?
2. Facts of case applied to statute?
a. "operate, run or participate in"
b. "a contest, game or other like activity"
c. "in which a pig"
d. "greased, oiled or otherwise"
e. "where the object is the capture of such pig"
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During the second class, the students use the checklist to
"walk through" the application of the facts to the law to deter-
mine whether Ms. Hogg's conduct is covered by the statute.
The professor should demonstrate that this "matching" pro-
cess is not unlike the "Sesame Street Skills" they have al-
ready developed much earlier in their lives. In fact, at its
most simplistic level, the process is not unlike matching
states with capitals, which virtually all elementary school
students are required to do. To demonstrate this, the profes-
sor should list the statutory elements on one half of the black-
board and ask the students what facts most closely "match"
each of the elements. The result of this matching process
might look like this:
Element Of Statute Facts From "Hog Problem"
"operate, run, or "organized a pig contest";
participate in" participated in contest by
"being first to wrestle hog"
"a contest, game or other "organized a pig contest"; "the
like activity" contest was against state law"
"in which a pig" "250-pound hog"
"greased, oiled or "mud two feet deep"
otherwise"
"the object is the capture "idea [of the contest] "was ...
of such pig" to ... capture the animal"
Once the students list the facts that most closely "match"
each element of the statute, they are shown how this type of
"checklist-matching" can help them with organizing their ex-
ams and determining which issues are worth focusing on and
which issues can be dealt with more summarily. If the ele-
ments and the facts match exactly, then the students know
that the element does not need to be discussed in depth.
Rather, the student can simply apply "the law" (the statutory
elements in this case, or the elements of a cause of action, or
the factors in a common law standard) to the facts in a cur-
sory fashion. For example, a student answer might simply
state the following regarding the first element: "Ms. Hogg op-
erated and participated in the hog wrestling match since she
'organized' the pig contest and she was one of the first adults
to 'participate' in the event by wrestling the hog." Similar
short statements linking the statutory elements to the facts
could be made regarding the issues of whether Ms. Hogg or-
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ganized a "contest" and whether the object of the contest was
the "capture" of the animal.
However, the students should also be able to discern that
the "match" between the other two elements (whether "a pig"
was "greased, oiled or otherwise") and the facts of the Hog
Problem are not as precise. Thus, students should recognize
that they must spend more time analyzing these issues. The
process of finding the easy matches and then focusing on the
difficult matches is not unlike the "Sesame Street Skill" of
working on a puzzle. Even very young children quickly learn
to lay out the easy pieces first-the corners and the straight-
edged pieces forming the perimeter of the puzzle. Then the
child will focus on the rest of the pieces-turning them differ-
ent ways to see how they might fit within the framework of
the puzzle.
Law students must do the same with the factual pieces
that do not quite fit within the framework of the statute.
This is the heart of legal analysis,, and in many ways, the
"fun" part of taking an exam, because there is usually no
right or wrong answer. Rather, students have an opportunity
to turn the puzzle pieces different ways to see if they fit
within the two remaining statutory requirements. First, the
statute uses the term "pig," but Ms. Hogg's contest involved a
"hog." The regulation was passed to prohibit cruelty to
thirty- to forty-pound pigs used in greased-pig contests (or
possibly, to ensure the safety of the children who participated
in the contests). The student might note that although hogs
and pigs are both porcine animals, a 250-pound animal would
seem to be less in need of protection than a thirty- to forty-
pound animal (and four adults might be less in need of pro-
tection than a group of children). However, the student
might query whether it is any less cruel to stick a hog "butt
first" into a barrel than to chase a pig around a rodeo ring.
As to the second "mismatched" requirement, that the animal
be "greased, oiled or otherwise," there is nothing in the facts
to indicate that the hog was "greased" or "oiled." Thus, stu-
dents must consider what the legislature meant by the words
"or otherwise." Both grease and oil are slippery, as is the two
feet of mud the hog was in, so if the legislature meant "or
otherwise slippery," the regulation would seem to cover Ms.
Hogg's conduct. On the other hand, it is possible that the leg-
islature meant to protect pigs from having a foreign sub-
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stance, such as the vegetable shortening used in greased-pig
contests, applied to their skin. In this case, mud would not
logically be included in the phrase "or otherwise," since mud
is a natural element for pig-wallowing. In fact, mud acts as a
sun screen for pigs' sensitive skin.
Once students have analyzed whether Ms. Hogg's con-
duct was covered by the statute, they use the second part of
the Hog Problem Checklist to consider other similarities and
differences between the hog-wrestling matches and greased-
pig contests in order to determine whether the legislature in-
tended the statute to cover Ms. Hogg's contest. The second
part of the Hog Problem Checklist is as follows:
Does It Appear That the Statute Was Enacted to Cover
Such Conduct?
1. Differences between contests prior to passage of stat-
ute & present case
a. thirty- to forty-pound pig vs. 250-pound hog
b. coated with vegetable shortening vs. mud
c. forty youngsters vs. four adults
d. twenty-second capture vs. 1 minute, thirty-five sec-
ond capture
e. pig kept vs. released
2. Possible policy reasons for passage of statute
The comparisons and contrasts that the students glean from
the checklist are not unlike the challenge the law students
once faced as young children when Ernie sang on "Sesame
Street": "One of these things is not like the other; one of
these things just doesn't belong. Can you guess which thing
is not like the other before I finish my song?"
B. The Second Building Block: Thinking Like a Professor
The second analytical exercise, known as the "Big and
Little Brother Problem," builds on the "matching" skills stu-
dents learned in the "Hog Problem" by demonstrating how
the "factors" commonly found in judicially created tests or
guidelines (and, for that matter, the elements of various
causes of action) are similar to the requirements of a statute.
In the "Big and Little Brother Problem," the students are
given a single case, Dillon v. Legg, 5 and are asked to apply
the case to a new set of facts. In Dillon, the California
Supreme Court allowed a "bystander" to recover for negligent
15. 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968).
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infliction of emotional distress. 16 The "bystander" in Dillon
was a mother who saw her daughter struck and killed by a
car. 17 In reaching its decision, the court provided three fac-
tors to guide future courts in similar cases:
In determining, in such a case, whether defendant should
reasonably foresee the injury to plaintiff, or, in other ter-
minology, whether defendant owes plaintiff a duty of due
care, the courts will take into account such factors as the
following: (1) Whether plaintiff was located near the
scene of the accident as contrasted with one who was a
distance away from it. (2) Whether the shock resulted
from a direct emotional impact upon plaintiff from the
sensory and contemporaneous observance of the accident,
as contrasted with learning of the accident from others af-
ter its occurrence. (3) Whether plaintiff and the victim
were closely related, as contrasted with an absence of any
relationship or the presence of only a distant
relationship. 18
Like the "Hog Problem," the students must consider the pol-
icy implications underlying the tests or guidelines as well as
their factual application.
In discussing the Dillon guidelines 19 in class, the stu-
dents are encouraged to "think like a professor" by consider-
ing how they might construct a law school examination using
the guidelines. This "Sesame Street Skill" is commonly
16. Id. at 925.
17. Id. at 915.
18. Id. at 912. Almost twenty years later, in Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d
814 (Cal. 1989), the California Supreme Court refused to allow recovery to a
mother who saw her "bloody and unconscious child ... lying in the roadway"
shortly after being hit by a car because the mother neither saw nor heard the
accident. Id. at 815. The court felt that "[elven if it is 'foreseeable' that persons
other than closely related percipient witnesses may suffer emotional distress,
this fact does not justify the imposition of what threatens to become unlimited
liability for emotional distress on a defendant whose conduct is simply negli-
gent." Id. at 829. In order to avoid this result, the court replaced the Dillon
guidelines with the following test:
We conclude, therefore, that a plaintiff may recover damages for emo-
tional distress caused by observing the negligently inflicted injury of a
third person if, but only if, said plaintiff: (1) is closely related to the
injury victim; (2) is present at the scene of the injury producing event
at the time it occurs and is then aware that it is causing injury to the
victim; and (3) as a result suffers serious emotional distress-a reac-
tion beyond that which would be anticipated in a disinterested witness
and which is not an abnormal response to the circumstances.
Id. at 829-30 (footnotes omitted).
19. See Dillon, 441 P.2d at 912.
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known outside of law school as "psyching out the teacher."
Many students first become adept at "psyching out the
teacher" in junior high school, when they first study a foreign
language in depth. For example, language students soon
learn that, rather than focus on the "easy issue" of translat-
ing a sentence using a regular verb, teachers inevitably re-
quire the more "challenging issue" of translating a sentence
using an irregular verb that seems to follow no set rule of
conjugation. Just as junior high school students soon learn
which verbs are most apt to be tested, so, too, law school stu-
dents can learn which issues are most likely to appear on a
law school examination. Moreover, if law students can learn
to "think like a professor" in constructing an exam question,
they may also be able to "think like a professor" in analyzing
the issue.
In the classroom discussion, the students are first asked
to try to determine what facts a professor might use in an
exam, if he or she did not want students to spend time on the
issue (i.e., if he or she wanted to create a "corner" piece of the
exam puzzle). Using the relationship guideline and keeping
in mind the facts of the Dillon case, the clearest answer
would probably be a parent-child relationship,2 ° with only a
slight stretch to a husband-wife relationship. 21 The students
are then asked to "think like a professor" who wanted to cre-
ate a more challenging issue. The students might suggest
facts that progressed further into blood relationships, i.e.,
what about a nephew-uncle relationship, 22 or a cousin-
cousin?23 Or the students might begin to enjoy "playing pro-
fessor" and begin to construct more elaborate facts; i.e., what
about allowing recovery to a natural child adopted at birth
20. See Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 921 (Cal. 1968) (noting that "[t]he neg-
ligent driver who causes the death of a young child may reasonably expect that
the mother will not be far distant and will upon witnessing the accident suffer
emotional trauma").
21. See, e.g., Krouse v. Graham, 562 P.2d 1022, 1035 (Cal. 1977).
22. See, e.g., Krivenstsov v. San Rafael Taxicabs, 229 Cal. Rptr. 768, 770
(1986) (finding that a cause of action was stated where an uncle observed the
hit-and-run death of his nephew because the plaintiff and victim had "a close,
warm and loving relationship, analogous to that of parent and child").
23. See, e.g., Trapp v. Schuyler Constr., 197 Cal. Rptr. 411, 412 (1986)
(holding recovery denied where a plaintiff and victim were first cousins because
they were "family members well beyond the immediate unit of parents and chil-
dren"). But cf Leong v. Takasaki 520 P.2d 758 (Haw. 1974) (allowing a step-
grandson to recover for the death of his step-grandmother).
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who had never met his or her biological parents before coinci-
dentally witnessing an accident in which both were killed?
The students might also work from of the language of the
guideline itself in learning to "think like a professor." They
might note that the relationship guideline does not include
language requiring a familial or blood relationship; rather,
the guideline contrasts a close relationship with a distant re-
lationship or no relationship at all.24 They might analyze
how this language would affect whether a natural child
adopted at birth could recover, by determining where on the
guideline continuum an adopted child might fall. They might
then consider drafting a set of facts where there was no legal
or blood relationship at all. What about a foster child, who
had no blood or legal ties to his or her foster parents, but had
spent all of his of her life with them?25 What about a couple
who were in love and living together for a period of years but
were not married?26 These questions should lead the stu-
dents to consider the policies underlying the guidelines-the
desire to compensate meritorious plaintiffs with the often
competing goal of limiting the liability of the defendant.
Considering the policy implications of the guidelines might
lead the students to more analytical questions. For example,
isn't a foster child who loves his foster parents, and has spent
his entire life as part of their family, likely to be as deserving
a plaintiff as a natural son, especially if that son is estranged
from the family? Where do you draw the line if you allow
someone without blood or legal ties to recover? What about
best friends 28 or classmates? If you limit recovery to legal or
blood relationships, how do you justify a rule that would al-
low recovery to a woman for witnessing an accident leading to
the loss of her husband the day after her marriage, but would
deny that woman recovery if she saw the same accident while
24. See Dillon, 441 P.2d at 925.
25. See, e.g., Mobaldi v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 127 Cal. Rptr. 720, 723-24
(1976) (allowing recovery to a foster mother who witnessed the death of her
three-year-old foster son based on "the emotional attachments of the family re-
lationship and not legal status").
26. See, e.g., Elden v. Sheldon, 758 P.2d 582 (1988) (denying recovery where
the plaintiff and the victim were in an unmarried cohabitation relationship).
27. See Dillon, 441 P.2d at 922.
28. See, e.g., Kately v. Wilkinson, 195 Cal. Rptr. 902, 932 (1983) (finding
that no cause of action was stated where the plaintiff and victim were best
friends, because "to hold that sufficient would be to abandon the Dillon admoni-
tion that the courts exclude the remote and unexpected").
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driving to the wedding? What if the defendant who caused
the accident knew beforehand about the "close relationship"
between the woman and her spouse and knew that she would
see an accident if it occurred? Wouldn't this establish fore-
seeability, and the defendant's duty to the plaintiff, irrespec-
tive of the guidelines? These are the kinds of issues that can
be developed in class discussion that help the students learn
to "think like a professor."
The students are then required to analyze the "Big and
Little Brother Problem" 29 from the four different perspectives
29. The facts of the "Big and Little Brother Problem" are as follows:
Stephen Lewis had always wanted a son. Instead, he had been blessed (be-
set) with four daughters and three female cats, none of whom were the least bit
interested in accompanying him on his frequent hunting expeditions. One day
Mr. Lewis read a newspaper article about a local Big Brother program where
lonely, often fatherless, boys were matched with male adults who could provide
them with companionship and new experiences.
Hoping to find a potential hunting partner, Mr. Lewis signed up for the
program last February, agreeing to see his "little brother," Johnny Boone, on at
least a weekly basis. Though Johnny was even less interested in hunting than
Mr. Lewis' daughters, the two shared many other activities, and both enjoyed
the time they spent together.
On August 21, 1991, to celebrate the six-month anniversary of their first
meeting, Mr. Lewis planned a calamari luncheon at Abalonetti's Restaurant on
the Monterey Wharf for his four daughters, Johnny, and Gordon Doright, the
director of the Big Brother Program. While finishing their cannoli dessert, Mr.
Doright, who had driven his own car, asked Johnny to ride back to Santa Clara
County with him, since he hoped Johnny might know of some other boys in need
of Big Brothers. Shortly thereafter, Johnny started the drive home in the
Doright car, while Mr. Lewis and his daughters followed in their car.
Upon rounding a curve in the road, Mr. Lewis observed the Doright auto
smashed against a cypress tree. Knowing instantly that Johnny was in the car,
either dead or dying, Mr. Lewis ran from his car and reached the wreckage
before the dust had settled. Overcome by the shocking sight of his mortally
wounded "little brother," Mr. Lewis collapsed. He was subsequently hospital-
ized for a nervous breakdown and remains under psychiatric care for high blood
pressure, extreme nervousness, and insomnia due to continual nightmares.
Mr. Lewis filed a civil complaint in Santa Clara County Superior Court
against Dr. Doright seeking compensation for the physical injuries he suffered
as a result of Johnny Boone's death. Mr. Doright demurred on the ground that
Lewis had failed to state a cause of action for physical injuries for emotional
distress in accordance with relevant California law. The trial court granted Mr.
Doright's demurrer. Mr. Lewis appealed but the Court of Appeal upheld the
trial court's ruling. Mr. Lewis then appealed to the California Supreme Court,
which has granted a hearing.
Assume that you are spending an enjoyable semester as a judicial extern
for California Supreme Court Justice Lotta Law. Please write a memorandum
for Justice Law explaining whether the trial court properly granted the demur-
rer. Your excellent research has discovered that the only relevant law is the
California Supreme Court case of Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968).
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developed in the class discussion: Comparing the facts of the
Problem with the facts of Dillon;3 0 determining where on the
Dillon guideline continuum31 the facts of the problem fit; con-
sidering the policy implications of allowing (and not allowing)
recovery; and discussing whether there is foreseeability irre-
spective of the guidelines.
C. Building Block Three: Synthesizing
The third analytical exercise, known as the "Shark Prob-
lem," involves a synthesis of cases.3 2 If Dillon is used for the
30. Id. at 915.
31. Id. at 924-25.
32. "The Shark Problem:"
Larry Lexis and Susan Shepard, second-year law students at Santa Clara
University School of Law, were very much in love. Since the beginning of their
first year of law school, Larry and Susan enjoyed an intimate and monogamous
relationship. They began living together during the spring semester of their
first year, and continued living together during the summer while both were
law clerks at the firm of Dewey, Screwem and Howe.
In October of their second year of law school, Susan discovered that she
was pregnant. Although Larry and Susan decided at that point that they
wanted to raise a family and spend the rest of their lives together, they vowed
that they would not marry until Congress removed the tax disincentives for
married couples, a prospect which neither one thought was likely. Besides,
they felt that their love for one another was a much stronger bond than any
piece of paper. Feeling that their moral commitment to one another surpassed
any type of legal commitment, they never entered into any formal or informal
contract of support or other obligation.
During the fall semester of their second year of law school, Larry and Su-
san became very good friends with their brilliant but absent-minded tax profes-
sor, Martin Dale Hubbell. Martin and his girlfriend, Wendy Witkin, would fre-
quently invite Larry and Susan over for cookies. When Martin suggested that
the two couples spend part of Christmas vacation scuba diving off Catalina,
Larry and Susan, who had never scuba-dived before, eagerly agreed.
Early in the morning on December 27th, the foursome rented scuba gear
and a motorboat at Catalina Harbor, and began making their way toward the
isolated waters off the western side of the island. The boat was driven by Mar-
tin, an experienced scuba diver who was well acquainted with the waters
around Catalina. As they approached their destination, Martin explained that
there were two bays in the area, Pleasant Bay and Vicious Bay, located on oppo-
site sides of a jetty. He further explained that, although Vicious Bay was in-
fested with sharks, Pleasant Bay was protected from sharks by a coral reef.
Martin assured Susan (who, being four months pregnant, had decided not to
scuba-dive herself) that Larry would be perfectly safe diving in Pleasant Bay.
Larry decided that he would be the first to dive. Martin helped Larry put
on his scuba gear, and told Larry how to use the equipment. As Susan blew him
a kiss, Larry jumped into the water and began his first-ever scuba dive. What
Larry did not know was that this would also be his last scuba dive, since, due to
a horrible navigational error by Martin, they had mistakenly ended up in Vi-
cious Bay.
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single case assignment, the professor should add the cases of
Justus v. Atchison,3 3 Krouse v. Graham,34 and Mobaldi v. Re-
gents of the University of California35 for the synthesis exer-
cise. As part of this assignment, the students are shown how
their "Sesame Street Skills" can assist them in understand-
ing common law development. The guidelines developed by
the California Supreme Court in Dillon were modified by Jus-
tus and Krouse, and were ultimately replaced by the stan-
dard in Thing v. La Chusa.36 This type of common law devel-
opment and modification of "rules" is familiar to virtually all
high school students. For example, assume that Mr. and
Mrs. Jones established a "rule" during their son Johnny's
freshman year that he had to be home by 10:00 p.m. on a
school night. The first modification of the rule might occur
when Johnny informed his parents that the local library was
open until 10:00 p.m. and he wanted to study until the library
closed. The rule might then be modified to allow Johnny to be
home at 10:30 p.m. on a school night if he was studying at the
library. The next common law development might occur
when the rule was modified to allow for Johnny's late arrival
From the moment Larry jumped into the water, Susan lovingly watched
the bubbles which rose to the surface every time Larry exhaled. After about 15
minutes, however, the bubbles suddenly stopped. Horrified, Susan jumped up,
clutched the rail and stared into the water, wondering what possibly could have
happened to Larry. Within a minute after the bubbles stopped, Susan saw a
dark pool of blood form on the surface. She screamed hysterically, bringing
Martin out of his absent-minded reverie. Upon seeing the blood, Martin hur-
riedly put on his scuba gear and jumped into the water. He was under the
surface for about ten minutes, during which time Susan anxiously hoped
against hope that her lover might yet be alive.
Susan could see Martin coming to the surface with a body in his hands.
Martin's head popped out of the water and he announced, with tears in his eyes,
"I'm sorry, Larry's dead." Susan then reached down and pulled Larry's man-
gled corpse onto the boat and cradled him in her arms. As a result of the entire
episode, she suffered severe emotional distress, which resulted in a
miscarriage.
Susan brought an action against Martin in the Superior Court of Santa
Clara County for negligent infliction of emotional distress. Martin admitted
negligence, but demurred on the ground that the complaint filed to state a
cause of action under Dillon v. Legg and its progeny. The trial court dismissed
the complaint. The California Court of Appeal affirmed. The California
Supreme Court has granted a hearing, thus vacating the Court of Appeal's
decision.
33. 565 P.2d 122 (Cal. 1977).
34. 562 P.2d 1022 (Cal. 1977).
35. 127 Cal. Rptr. 720 (1976).
36. 771 P.2d 814, 817 (Cal. 1989). For an explanation of the standard of
Thing, see supra note 18.
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after a school activity, such as rehearsal for a school play, or
after a sporting event, such as a football game. Ultimately,
there might be so many exceptions that the rule would be
thrown out entirely and a new rule established that would
simply allow Johnny to remain out until 10:30 p.m. on a
school night.
D. Building Block Four: Analyzing Multiple Cases
The final analytical exercise that focuses on establishing
the building blocks of legal analysis"7 is known as "The Shark
Problem Revisited." 38 This exercise adds additional cases to
those relied on in the synthesis problem, using the same set
of facts, and helps the students to understand the concepts of
precedent and authority. The format is changed from a neu-
tral office memorandum or client letter to a persuasive writ-
ing style. The students are required to write two separate
Memoranda of Points and Authorities or two separate appel-
late briefs-first from the plaintiff or appellant's perspective,
then from the defendant or respondent's perspective. Ap-
proximately half of the cases in the assignment, including
both controlling and persuasive authority, favor the plaintiff,
while the other half favor the defendant.
37. In addition to the exercises establishing the building blocks of legal
analysis, the course has five additional assignments, including an in-class essay
examination and four performance tests.
38. "The Shark Problem Revisited:"
In the synthesis problem you just completed, you were asked to write an
objective memorandum using the facts of Shepard v. Hubbell and four cases.
Your next assignment involves doing two advocative Memoranda of Points and
Authorities using the stipulated facts of Shepard v. Hubbell and any (or all) of
the cases listed below. If you decide not to use a case in your argument, please
briefly explain why you reached that decision. You should assume that the
Shepard case is back at the trial court level. For this assignment, you should
focus on your legal analysis, your advocative writing style, and your use of au-
thority. Case List:
Archibald v. Braverman, 79 Cal. Rptr. 723 (1969).
Austin v. Regents of University of California, 152 Cal. Rptr. 420
(1979).
Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968).
Drew v. Drake, 168 Cal. Rptr. 65 (1980).
Justus v. Atchison, 565 P.2d 122 (Cal. 1977).
Krouse v. Graham, 562 P. 2d 1022 (Cal. 1977).
Ledger v. Tippitt, 210 Cal. Rptr. 814 (1985).
Mobaldi v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Cal., 127 Cal. Rptr. 720 (1976).
Nazaroff v. Superior Court, 145 Cal. Rptr. 657 (1978).
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The concepts of precedent, and controlling and persua-
sive authority, are also familiar "Sesame Street" ideas, at
least to any child with older siblings. For example, once
Johnny's parents set his curfew as 10:30 p.m. on a high school
night, his younger sister, Jennifer, will assume that the rule
set by her parents for her brother will also set a precedent for
her, meaning that she will also be able to stay out until 10:30
p.m. once she starts high school. Jennifer's early awareness
of levels of authority would also be apparent if, after Jennifer
was a freshman in high school, Johnny was baby-sitting, and
he tried to insist that Jennifer had to be in at 10:00 p.m.
(rather than 10:30). Jennifer would immediately contact her
parents (as a higher court) to set her brother straight, demon-
strating her understanding of the controlling authority of her
parents over her brother. Jennifer might also show an under-
standing of persuasive authority, if she wanted to convince
her parents to allow her to stay out until 11:00 p.m. on a
school night. She might try to argue to her parents that "all
her friends' parents let them stay out until 11:00 p.m." (an
argument that most parents find unpersuasive). It is also
clear that Jennifer would have a nascent concept of an equal
protection analysis if her parents tried to impose a different
curfew on her than they imposed on her brother. Although
she might phrase the argument with the words "that's not
fair," the basis of her objection would be that you cannot treat
males and females differently.
E. Building Block Five: Self-Confidence
The final "Sesame Street Skill," self-confidence, is an at-
tribute the seminar often needs to rebuild after the first year
in law school. Many of the seminar students come into the
class with very poor self-images as a result of receiving low
marks, perhaps for the first time in their academic careers.
Occasionally students will manifest their insecurities by
blaming the law school or a particular professor for their aca-
demic difficulties. Although sometimes initially hostile to the
seminar class, these students will generally "come around" as
they begin to see their legal analysis and writing improve.
Instilling self-confidence requires a positive attitude on the
part of the instructor, both in terms of believing in the value
of the class and in terms of believing in the abilities of the
individual students. A positive, helpful approach can go a
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long way toward changing a student's negative self-image
(and counteracting some of the occasional harshness of the
Socratic method). Perhaps this point is best illustrated by
quoting a passage from You Just Don't Understand,39 a fasci-
nating book by Deborah Tannen on male-female communica-
tion differences:
Martha bought a computer and needed to learn to use
it. After studying the manual and making some progress,
she still had many questions, so she went to the store
where she had bought it and asked for help. The man as-
signed to help her made her feel like the stupidest person
in the world. He used technical language in explaining
things, and each time she had to ask what a word meant
she felt more incompetent, an impression reinforced by
the tone of voice he used in his answer, a tone that sent
the metamessage "This is obvious; everyone knows this."
He explained things so quickly, she couldn't possibly re-
member them. When she went home, she discovered she
couldn't recall what he had demonstrated, even in cases
when she had followed his explanation at the time.
Still confused, and dreading the interaction, Martha
returned to the store a week later, determined to stay un-
til she got the information she needed. But this time a
woman was assigned to help her. And the experience of
getting help was utterly transformed. The woman
avoided using technical terms for the most part, and if she
did use one, she asked whether Martha knew what it
meant and explained simply and clearly if she didn't.
When the woman answered questions, her tone never im-
plied that everyone should know this. And when showing
how to do something, she had Martha do it, rather than
demonstrating while Martha watched. The different style
of this "teacher" made Martha feel like a different "stu-
dent": a competent rather than stupid one, not humili-
ated by her ignorance.4 °
39. DEBORAH TANNEN, YOU JUST DON'T UNDERSTAND (1990).
40. Id. at 66-67.
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IV. APPLYING EDUCATIONAL THEORIES TO THE SEMINAR IN
LEGAL ANALYSIS AND WRITING
A. Applying the Theory of Metacognition
1. Introduction
Most law students have succeeded in their undergradu-
ate careers because they have mastered traditional learning
methods. They have developed the skills of memorization,
note-taking, and review that are recommended by many texts
dealing with how to succeed in law school. 6' However, they
have failed to understand that law school requires an addi-
tional layer of learning-the application of a body of law to a
set of facts. Furthermore, they have not recognized that
"traditional study skills materials generally do not teach stu-
dents to monitor and then change their learning and studying
activities as the situation demands."4 2
It is only when the students focus on modifying their
learning and studying skills to become proficient in legal
analysis that their grades on law school exams begin to show
improvement. This "awareness [by the students] of the learn-
ing process" itself is referred to by learning theorists as
Metacognition.43 As students "become increasingly aware of
processes involved, they can exercise degrees of control over
some of them."44
2 Stage 1: Students' Evaluating Their Learning
Abilities With Respect To The Learning Task At
Hand
Metacognition involves two discrete stages. In the first
stage, the student introspectively evaluates his or her own
learning abilities with respect to the learning task at hand.45
41. See, e.g., JOHN DELANEY, How To Do YOUR BEST ON LAW SCHOOL Ex-
AMs (John Delaney Publications 1982); C. MAYFIELD, READING SKILLS FOR LAW
STUDENTS (Michie Co. 1981).
42. See Wangerin, supra note 1 at 477 (citing Brown & Palincsar, Inducing
Strategic Learning from Texts by Means of Informed, Self-Control Training, 2
Topics IN LEARNING & LEARNING DISABILITIES 1, 3-4 (1982)).
43. Id. at 474-477.
44. Joseph Sanacore, Metacognition and the Improvement of Reading:
Some Important Links, 27 J. READING 706, 706-707 (1984).
45. See Wangerin, supra note 1, at 476 (citing Schmitt and Newby,
Metacognition: Relevance to Instructional Design, 9(4) J. INSTRUCTIONAL DEV.
29 (1986); see also, Baker and Brown, Metacognitive Skills & Reading, HAND-
BOOK OF READING RESEARCH, 353, 353 (P. Pearson Ed. 1984)) (describing this
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Learning theorists believe that "effective studying comes
from an understanding of the processes of learning and a re-
alization that different kinds of learning processes can bring
about different results."46 In the seminar, the assignments
are structured so that the students must focus on the "learn-
ing process" of legal analysis. The traditional learning skills
of memorization, note-taking, and review are not relevant
abilities to the learning task at hand. The students are pro-
vided with a "canned world of law," and their analysis of a
particular set of facts is limited to those cases. The students
are not required to do any independent research. In fact,
they are specifically precluded from adding any new cases to
their legal world. Similarly, they do not need to rely on their
memory and review of the law, or their notes regarding a par-
ticular substantive legal principle, because the cases are al-
ways available for reference. Rather, the students have to fo-
cus on the more abstract learning skills of interpretation and
analysis.
3. Stage 2: Students' Evaluating Their Study Acts
And Modifying Their Learning Approaches
The second stage of Metacognition involves the ability of
students to evaluate periodically their study activities and
modify their learning approach if demanded by the learning
task at hand.4" Learning theorists describe this stage of
Metacognition as involving four sub-processes: "[1]
[C]hecking the outcome of any attempt to solve the problem;
[2] planning one's next move; [31 monitoring the effectiveness
of any attempted action; and [4] testing, revising and evaluat-
ing one's strategies for learning. "48 Once again, the seminar
is structured in a way that ensures that the students will con-
tinually evaluate the success of their analytical activities and
modify their approaches, if necessary. Every class assign-
ment is extensively critiqued, both in writing and in individ-
ual student conferences. The written critique of most of the
assignments is completed within a week. The critiqued as-
initial stage as involving "a person's knowledge about his or her own cognitive
resources and compatibility between the person as a learner and the learning
situation").
46. See Wangerin, supra note 1, at 476 (citing Baker and Brown, supra note
45, at 353-54).
47. See id. at 476-77.
48. See id.(citing Baker and Brown, supra note 45, at 354).
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signments are then returned to the students, with individual
conferences scheduled the following day, so that the students
have an opportunity to review the comments and are ready to
discuss them. The written critique gives the students a
chance to check the outcome of their attempt to solve the ana-
lytical problem and to monitor the effectiveness of their at-
tempted solution. During the conference, the students have
an opportunity to thoroughly discuss their analysis and to
plan their next move.
In the conferences, the students should be encouraged to
articulate the reasons for the conclusions made in their anal-
ysis. Frequently, the students are able to state orally the
steps they have taken, even though this logical progression is
lacking in their written product. The explanation for this ap-
parent anomaly could be the fact that the students do not un-
derstand (or perhaps do not believe) that it is the explanation
of the logical steps they took to reach their conclusions, not
the conclusions themselves, that are crucial to their analysis
(and to their success in law school). The cure for this anom-
aly is for the professor to encourage the students to write
down all their thought processes, even if they feel their think-
ing is too simplistic or self-evident. The seminar should be
offered only on a credit/non-credit basis in order to stimulate
the students' analytical freedom, unhampered by concerns of
whether their ideas will result in good grades.
All assignments are then rewritten by the students and
recritiqued by the professor. Both the original and the re-
written assignments are turned in to facilitate comparison
and comment. At times, the students rewrite only a portion
of their assignment, allowing them to focus their attention on
the weakest part of their analysis. Thus, each student has
ample opportunity for testing, revising, and evaluating his or
her strategies for accomplishing the task of legal analysis.
After their rewrites are completed, the students are given an-
alytical checklists and/or sample answers for each assign-
ment so that they can further evaluate their work.
At least part of the class should be spent discussing the
checklist, because many students benefit from repetition.4 9
In addition, both a written and an oral presentation of the
49. See Feinman & Feldman, supra note 1, at 900 & n.61 ("When the whole
class exhibits certain difficulties, simply reteaching in a traditional manner
may be appropriate.").
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analysis satisfies the needs of both the students who are vis-
ual learners and those who are auditory learners.
Throughout this cycle of critique, conference, rewrite,
and recritique, the students are encouraged to think cre-
atively about the possible ways to analyze a particular legal
problem. This process of trying to think of different ways to
do the same thing is referred to by educational theorists as
"divergent thinking."50 By contrast, convergent thinking oc-
curs when students limit their options.5 ' Use of divergent
thinking helps free the students to "play" with different anal-
yses of the issues raised by the seminar assignments and
helps them internalize and accept the fact that there may be
several different, equally "correct," answers to the same
question.
B. Applying the Autonomous Learning Model
1. Introduction
Professor Wangerin opines that "perhaps the best exam-
ple of the work being done by educational psychologists in
connection with the metacognitive aspects of studying skills
and learning strategies" is the Autonomous Learning Model
for studying and learning developed by John Thomas and
William Rohwer.52 Although this Model is very complex, it
enables an instructor to dissect the learning process into its
basic components and to focus on the discrete portions of the
Model that are relevant to a particular course. Reference to
the following charts may help readers visualize the skeletal
components of the entire Model and see the relationship of
the detailed, highlighted parts of the Model, which are those
focused on in the seminar, to the Model as a whole.53
2. Study Activities And Study Outcomes
As illustrated in Chart 1, the Autonomous Learning
Model requires students to consider four variables in deter-
50. See Moore, et al., Training for Thinking Skills in Relation to Two Cogni-
tive Measures, 20 J. RES. & DEV. IN EDUC. 59, 60 (1987).
51. See Wangerin, supra note 1, at 512-13.
52. See id. at 479-80 (citing John Thomas & William Rohwer, Academic
Studying: The Role of Learning Strategies, 21 EDUC. PSYCHOLOGIST 19 (1986)).
53. This chart is an edited and substantially modified version of the charts
appearing in Wangerin, supra note 1, at 481 and in Thomas & Rohwer, supra
note 52, at 23.
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mining for themselves the ideal method of studying and
learning: student characteristics,54 course characteristics, 55
study activities,5" and study outcomes. As indicated in
Chart 2, the seminar focuses only on the last two of these
variables: the actual learning methods, or "study activities;"
and the material the student hopes to master by the learning
method, or the "study outcomes." The other two variables,
student characteristics and course characteristics, require
student self-assessment, which is beyond the scope of the
seminar (and, indeed, probably beyond the scope of all law
school classes). 58 As illustrated in Chart 1, the Autonomous
Learning Model divides study activities into "cognitive activi-
ties" and "self-management activities."59 Chart 2 reveals
that the seminar deals only with cognitive activities.6 As in-
dicated in Chart 1, cognitive activities are further subdivided
into four subactivities: memorization, selection, integration,
and cognitive monitoring.61 Thomas and Rohwer have also
54. Wangerin, supra note 1, at 485-86.
55. Id. at 485 (citing Thomas & Rohwer, supra note 52, at 26).
56. Id. at 483-85 (citing Thomas & Rohwer, supra note 52, at 23-25).
57. Id. at 481-83 (citing Thomas & Rohwer, supra note 52, at 22).
58. The first of these variables, student characteristics, suggests that stu-
dents consider their own individual skills, experiences, and mental and physi-
cal abilities in the process of assessing what studying methods are apt to work
best for them. See Thomas & Rohwer, supra note 52, at 26-27. This type of
self- assessment would also seem to be crucial in determining what courses to
take and what professor to take the course from, and indeed, whether to have
enrolled in law school in the first place. Similarly, the second variable, course
characteristics, suggests that the students take into account the learning re-
quirements of the course and the idiosyncracies of the professor teaching the
class in determining the method of study and the outcome desired. See
Wangerin, supra note 1, at 485. Wangerin points out, for example, that Prop-
erty courses frequently require memorization of a number of specific and an-
cient rules, while Contracts courses require memorization of "only a few rules,
emphasizing their factual application." Wangerin, supra note 1, at 485.
59. See Thomas & Rohwer, supra note 52, at 25.
60. Like the variables of student and course characteristics, self-manage-
ment activities require the students to assess their individual ability to manage
the time and effort demanded by their courses, in the hope of learning how to
"maintain and enhance the attention, effort and time [they] devote to learning."
Thomas & Rohwer, supra note 52, at 25. Basically, self-management activities
seem to combine the worthy goals of maintaining good study habits and taking
care of one's mental and physical needs. However, no matter how worthy these
goals may be, or how individualized the instruction in a class may be, it is un-
likely, and possibly inappropriate, for law school professors to try to ascertain
whether their students are getting enough rest or are working too hard on one
assignment and not hard enough on others.
61. See Thomas & Rohwer, supra note 52, at 24.
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divided study outcomes into two categories: "Informational
products" (the forms of the knowledge that will come from
study activities)62 and "performance capabilities" (the ways
in which students can act on that knowledge).
63
3. Cognitive Activities And Resultant Study Outcomes
a. Introduction
Chart 1 illustrates the links between cognitive activities
and the resultant study outcomes. Three of the cognitive ac-
tivities-memorization, selection, and integration-lead di-
rectly to specific study outcomes.64 Memorization leads to
verbatim knowledge. 65 Selection, which involves differentiat-
ing between and within sources of information, produces in-
terpreted knowledge.66 Integration, which involves the study
of new material in light of previously studied material, leads
to constructed knowledge.67
b. Verbatim And Interpreted Knowledge Leading
To Recognizing And Producing Already
Learned Information (Spotting Issues
and Stating Rules)
Although both verbatim and interpreted knowledge are
relevant to law school learning, the seminar does not focus on
these skills. Verbatim knowledge is the most familiar to en-
tering law students, based on their undergraduate experi-
ence, since it represents the knowledge acquired by learning
and remembering the substantive material covered in law
school classes, casebooks, and other course materials.68 As
noted above, the teaching of substantive law is not the focus
62. See Wangerin, supra note 1, at 480 (citing Thomas & Rohwer, supra
note 52, at 22).
63. See Thomas & Rohwer, supra note 52, at 22.
64. The fourth subactivity, cognitive monitoring, "occurs when students
continually assess the need for and adequacy of different kinds of cognitive ac-
tivities in different kinds of learning situations .... It is ... thinking about
thinking itself." Wangerin, supra note 1, at 484. In other words, it is consider-
ing whether the cognitive activity of memorization is the appropriate learning
method for mastering the numerous exceptions to the hearsay rule and whether
the chosen method is successful. Once again, this is an activity that can, in fact,




68. Id. at 482, 484 (citing Thomas & Rohwer, supra note 52, at 22).
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of the seminar. Since the seminar requires no rote memoriza-
tion, the students do not have to worry about acquiring the
informational product outcome of verbatim knowledge.
Rather, the seminar requires the students to go beyond the
simple "regurgitation" of verbatim knowledge and mandates
the application of that knowledge in a particular factual
context.
The seminar also does not focus on interpreted knowl-
edge, at least as that term is defined in the Autonomous
Learning Model: "Interpreted knowledge . . .is knowledge
that allows people to paraphrase information and state the
general point or rule of materials read."69  Professor
Wangerin notes that in "law school, students develop inter-
preted knowledge when they learn how to state the rule or
holding in a particular case, or when they try to describe in
somewhat different words the essence of a particular stat-
ute."7 ° Although the seminar forces students to identify the
relevant rule or holding of a particular case or statute, the
students are cautioned not to paraphrase the language of the
rule or holding, since "trying to describe in somewhat differ-
ent words the essence of a particular statute" frequently re-
sults in ascribing a somewhat different meaning to the
words.7 1 Perhaps more than in any other learning discipline,
precise language is crucial in the law. The holdings in nu-
merous cases have turned on the meaning of a particular
word or phrase. 2
69. Id. at 482 (citing Thomas & Rohwer, supra note 52, at 22).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. See, e.g., United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 94-95 (1985) (holding that
a provision of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act, providing that
holders of certain mining claims to federal land must, "prior to December 31 of
each year," file certain documents or lose their claims, rendered several holders
of claims who had made their filings on December 31st "out of luck"); Griffin v.
Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 570, 575 (1982) (holding that a statute
requiring that the owner of a vessel, who failed to pay a discharged seaman the
balance of his unpaid wages within a specified time, "shall pay the seaman a
sum equal to two days pay for each and every day during which payment is
delayed beyond the respective periods," removed the courts' latitude in assess-
ing the wage penalty even though the result in Griffin was to reimburse the
seaman $302,000 for $412 in lost wages), and Holy Trinity Church v. U.S., 143
U.S. 457, 457, 472 (1892) (holding that by prohibiting the importation of any
"foreigner . . .to perform labor or service of any kind in the United States,"
Congress did not intend to prevent an American church from contracting for the
services of an English minister).
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As illustrated in Chart 1, verbatim and interpretive
knowledge lead to the performance capabilities of recognizing
and producing already learned information.73 This portion of
the Autonomous Learning Model is roughly the equivalent of
the I (Issue) and R (Rule-stating) portions of the IRAC
method of taking law school exams. Recognizing already-
learned information allows the student to spot the issues in a
given fact pattern. Producing information that has been
learned already allows the student to "regurgitate" the mem-
orized black-letter law. These are crucial skills to acquire in
law school, and thus, this portion of the Autonomous Learn-
ing Model is applicable to law school learning. This portion of
the Model, however, does not reach the heart of the seminar,
which is to teach the students to conduct legal analysis by
applying the law they have produced to a set of facts.
c. Constructed Knowledge Using The Component
Skills Of Legal Analysis And Leading To
Generalizing
Constructed knowledge, which results in the perform-
ance capability of generalizing, is the most directly relevant
portion of the Autonomous Learning Model to the seminar.
7 4
It is also the portion of the Autonomous Learning Model that
is the key to law school learning. Constructed knowledge in-
volves "an understanding of the relationships that exist be-
tween seemingly unrelated bits of information."7 5 It is this
skill that law students seem to have the most difficult time
developing, "perhaps because their undergraduate educations
placed little or no emphasis on this kind of knowledge."76
Students who wish to develop constructed knowledge "must
constantly look for relationships between seemingly unre-
lated bits of information."77
73. See Wangerin, supra note 1, at 480 (citing Thomas & Rohwer, supra
note 52, at 22).
74. Id. at 482, 484 (citing Thomas & Rohwer, supra note 52, at 22).
75. Thomas & Rohwer, supra note 52, at 22. Thomas & Rohwer further
define "constructed information" as consisting of at least the following subcat-
egories: "(a) underlying presuppositions, intentions, and entailments; (b)
within text connections, such as inferences and comparisons; and (c) connec-
tions of textual information with prior, extratext knowledge." Id.
76. Wangerin, supra note 1, at 482.
77. Id.
1153
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
The seminar helps the students develop constructed
knowledge by focusing on each of the component skills of
legal analysis that Wangerin describes as rule application,
synthesis, analogy, and reconciliation.7" These component
skills are learned gradually in the seminar as the assign-
ments increase in complexity.79 In the "Hog Problem," the
students must use deductive reasoning to apply a simple stat-
ute to a set of facts, a process referred to by Wangerin as "rule
application."8 0 In the "Big and Little Brother Problem," the
students continue to develop the skill of rule application by
applying a new set of facts to a single case.8' The "Shark
Problem" helps to develop the component skill of synthesis by
requiring the students to integrate the evaluation and inter-
pretation of the common law tests or guidelines from the sin-
gle case in subsequent cases.8 2 This synthesis process in-
volves the use of inductive reasoning in merging the separate
legal authorities.8 3 The students must then deductively ap-
ply their synthesis of the initial test or guidelines and their
judicial gloss to a new set of facts.8 4
The "Shark Problem Revisited" hones the last two com-
ponent skills of analogy and reconciliation by adding addi-
tional cases to those relied on in the synthesis problem, in-
cluding both cases favoring the plaintiff and cases favoring
the defendant.8 5 This dichotomy forces the students to rely
on the skill of analogy in attempting to show that the facts of
the favorable cases are sufficiently similar to the facts of the
hypothetical case, and that the principles of stare decisis re-
quire that the result in the present case be the same as the
result in the prior cases.8 6 Conversely, the students must
rely on the component skill of reconciliation, which Professor
78. Id. at 519-22.
79. See id. at 519 (citing Paul T. Wangerin, Skills Training in "Legal Analy-
sis": A Systematic Approach, 40 U. Mmmii L. REv. 409, 429-464 (1986)).
80. See id.
81. See id. at 519-22; see also supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text
(discussing the "Big and Little Brother Problem").
82. See Wangerin, supra note 1, at 519-22; see also supra notes 32-36 and
accompanying text (discussing the "Shark Problem").
83. See Wangerin, supra note 1, at 512, 519-21.
84. Id. at 511-12, 519-21.
85. See supra note 38 and accompanying text (discussing the "Shark Prob-
lem Revisited"); see also Wangerin, supra note 1, at 519-22.
86. Wangerin, supra note 1, at 520. This also helps students deal with dif-
fering levels of authority, since they must analyze both controlling and persua-
sive decisions.
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Wangerin describes as the "mirror image of analogy,"8 7 to
show that the facts of the unfavorable cases are sufficiently
dissimilar to the facts of the hypothetical problem (a process
commonly known as distinguishing) that the principles of
stare decisis do not require that the court reach the prior re-
sult. Wangerin points out that users of the component skill of
reconcilation may also "revert to the skill of synthesis by in-
ductively creating new legal rules" that are consistent with
the previous cases but produce the desired result in the pres-
ent problem.88 These reformulated rules can then be deduc-
tively applied to the facts of the problem. In the second part
of the "Shark Problem Revisited," the students represent the
opposing side and must reverse the roles of analogy and
reconciliation.
As students develop the component skills of legal analy-
sis in the seminar, they also acquire the "performance capa-
bility" of generalizing.89 Generalizing "requires students to
apply learned information to wholly new factual situa-
tions."90 This is the learning skill at the heart of the seminar.
It is also clearly the most important skill for a law student to
acquire. As Professor Wangerin notes: "Students in virtually
all law school courses will succeed only if they are capable of
generalizing about the information products already learned.
This is so because law school exams rarely ask students sim-
ply to recognize or recall information learned."91 Like law
school exams, the seminar assignments require students to
do far more than simply recognizing or recalling the informa-
tion learned. Rather, the students have an opportunity to
hone their analytical abilities and master the critical skill of
generalizing from constructed knowledge.
V CONCLUSION
A combination of "Sesame Street Skills," Metacognition,
and The Autonomous Learning Model can be used in a reme-
dial seminar to benefit students who have experienced diffi-
culty with legal analysis and exam-taking. If the same teach-
ing methods were incorporated into the traditional first-year
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 483.
90. Id. at 520.
91. Id. at 483 (citing Thomas & Rohwer, supra note 52, at 23).
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legal analysis, research, and writing courses, a similar bene-
fit might accrue earlier in each student's law school career.
During the 1992-94 academic years, Santa Clara University
School of Law is experimenting with a "Coordinated Curricu-
lum" for one-third of the first-year students, which may in-
clude some of the teaching approaches that have been imple-
mented in the seminar. It is hoped that this experiment will
achieve Professor Wangerin's goals of increasing the effec-
tiveness of teaching and learning for all of our first-year law
students, and serve as a model program for other law schools.
